Pricing’s influence on investment decisions (transcript)

This transcript is of a conversation I had with William Poundstone (listen to the podcast), author of the newish book, Priceless:The Myth of Fair Value (and How to Take Advantage of It)

Hi! I’m Zack Miller, author of the recent book TradeStream Your Way to Profits: Building a Killer Portfolio in the Age of Social Media, and you’re listening to Tradestreaming Radio, our home in the internet radio space. This is our place to discuss how technology is helping investors to become better, smarter, and more accurate at what they do.

You can find this podcast on iTunes. You can also find lots of other material relating to this podcast, as well as archives of our programs at my website www.tradestreaming.com There’s lots of other great content there as well, and I recommend you check it out.

We have a very interesting podcast setup for today. Joining us on the podcast will be Bill Poundstone, who’s the author of Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value (and How to Take Advantage of It). It’s a fantastic book, its gotten a lot of great reviews online and off as well. The book focuses mainly on retail pricing decisions, how consumers are affected by pricing. Things like damage awards in court cases setting precedents, anchoring in terms of negotiation, where we started a negotiation has a big effect on where we end the conversation; arbitrariness of numbers, contrast, a lot of issues that today’s behavioral economists are focusing on.

Bill Poundstone creates a really readable history of how we’ve come to understand how humans are effected by pricing. I took a little different tact; obviously, we’re concerned here at Tradestreaming with investor decisions. I asked a lot of questions to Bill about how investors react to the market, how psychological market pricing is, crowd-following in terms of piling on to a hot momentum stock. How is that affected by our perceptions of pricing? And, how susceptible we are, as investors, to cues that pricing is giving us?

Bill is a wealth of information. I hope you find this usable and interesting. Check out the book. I will link to the book on Amazon and to Bill’s site on the blog.

As always, we value your comments on Tradestreaming, please feel free to drop me an email, or leave your comments on the blog at: www.tradestreaming.com , and I hope to check in with you next week with another great podcast.

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The first question I had was traditional economics posited that economic man is somewhat rational, and obviously a lot of what you write about- that’s obviously being challenged. How is it being challenged?

Bill Poundstone: Well, certainly economics is based on the idea of a reserve price. The idea that everyone has a secret maximum that they are willing to pay for something, and all of their decisions, all of their actions, are really founded on that reserve price. You look at what the market price is and if your reserve price is higher you buy, otherwise you decide to keep your money in your pocket.

What psychologists have found, really just since the 1970s, is that really reserve prices are a kind of fiction. That we really manufacture these reserve prices almost on the spur of the moment, and they way we do that, actually, is a lot like the way that our senses work. In other words, if you go into a dark room suddenly, and you’ve been in a light room, everything is going to be completely dark, you won’t see anything. But once your eyes adjust to the darkness, you’ll be able to see all sorts of things. It’s really you’re very sensitive to contrast, but not so much to absolute values.

The surprising thing is that psychologists like Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have shown that with prices we really work much the same way. We are very sensitive to contrast.

A simple example of that, that you can see, is that if you go into a really fancy department store they will actually arrange it so that one of the first things you see will be something that is just outrageously expensive. And you’ll kind of look at that price tag and shake your head and say, you know, who would pay $2,000 for that handbag? But the reason they do that is because of the contrast effect. You’ll then look around it and you’ll see more reasonably priced stuff, and that’s going to seem like a bargain in comparison.

This almost sounds funny when you describe it, but they’ve done studies and found that this is really the way the human mind works. We are very sensitive to these contrasts, and if you have a sale that says, “This flat screen TV was once $2000, and now you can get it for just $1300,” even though you are a little skeptical about that original price of $2000, it still does affect your decisions, it does have an effect, and it causes more people to buy that. Again, it’s this idea that people are very sensitive to contrast.

Because these contrast effects are so big, it really does challenge this idea of a reserve price. That’s made an awful lot of differences in how we look at economics.

I guess the same issue would hold sway in the stock market, or obviously when someone pays $10 for a stock, the $10 doesn’t really mean anything, other than the fact that it’s the market cap divided by the number of outstanding shares. Comparing two stocks at a $10 price, doesn’t make any sense, because it really has to do with how big they are.

Do you see pricing influencing the way investors may look at stocks as well?

Poundstone: Yes, I think the stock market particularly is a good case of psychological pricing. Because, I mean no economist has really come up with an entirely convincing theory of what sort of price earnings ratio you should be paying. Really, a lot of it is based on crowd psychology, on what you see other people doing. There is just this natural tendency to follow the crowd, to do whatever you see other people doing. In situations like that, where there isn’t a clear value for something, we are particularly susceptible to all of these psychological cues.

I guess the stock market, as you’re mentioning, is sort of the collective wisdom of a lot of different investors, if an individual investor is somewhat irrational in their approach to pricing, we’ve always talked about the market as being more rational, obviously, because efficient market hypothesis, we assume all knowledge is sort of baked into the existing stock prices.

Is the market reflective of that collective? Would we see also a skew there that the market itself would actually be irrational according to what you’re discussing?

Poundstone: Yeah, it’s certainly the collective wisdom, but it’s also some of that collective irrationality. The classic example of that is that stock prices are much more volatile than stock earnings are. So, that shows that people really are susceptible to some sort of crowd effect, sometimes they decide they are going to be paying a lot more for earnings than they are at other times. It really seems to be this crowd effect, the psychology rather than any rational reason for that.

Currently the market continues to go up, and you read a lot of theory right now with quantitative easing. People are sort of piling into the stock market, whether they’re afraid of missing a run, or they’re just jumping in at the tail end of an existing run. Yet, there’s still this sort of macro economic wall of worry.

Why are people continuing to pile in, in the face of the fact that we’re looking down a summer or a year ahead of us of maybe some extreme volatility?

Poundstone: Yeah, well in many cases, in a lot of these psychological experiments they show that people really are very susceptible to what you might call the power of suggestion, to doing what other people do.

I mean the classic example is in a boring meeting if one person yawns, a whole lot of other people are going to yawn. It’s not that they’re making even a rational decision, that now is a good time to yawn, but you just sort of do it without thinking.

I think there’s a lot of similar effects at work in the stock market. The more people you see doing something, the more inclined you are to follow along.

There’s really kind of an interesting experiment on that was done in the 1950s where people were given what was called a “vision test”. They were just showed simple lines on sheets of paper and asked, “Is this line the same length as this line or not?”

Every question was actually very easy. One line was either obviously much longer, or not longer. What they did was have one real experimental subject in there with a lot of confederates of the experimenter. The confederates were there to give the wrong answer. They found that at least half of the people would give the wrong answer when everyone else was giving the wrong answer. No one wanted to be the one to say the emperor has no clothes, this is not right.

He asked people, “Why would you do that?” They gave all sorts of answers. Some said, “Well, I thought it was wrong, but I figured it must be me.” “I wasn’t seeing it right,” or, “It was a trick question,” or something.

So, they really showed that there is this incredibly strong tendency to do whatever you see other people doing, even when in the back of your mind you feel it’s wrong. I think that’s certainly what you see at market peaks, where everyone wants to get in, do what other people are doing, even though you do have a certain amount of worry in you.

It speaks to all the more importance of being a contrarian thinker, right?

Poundstone: Yes, definitely. Again, if you could sort of bottle contrarianism, and get some way of knowing when to use it, that would be a very valuable thing.

You speak about prospect theory in the book, and you describe what it is and how it impacts investors’ feelings toward losses. Can you describe a little bit about that?

Poundstone: Yeah, in its simplest form it basically means that there is this great asymmetry. We feel losses much more strongly than we feel gains. In other words if I gave you a fair bet and said, “I’m going to toss a coin, 50/50. You either win $100 if it’s heads, or you lose $100 if it’s tails,” most people would really not want that, because they know they would feel really bad if they lost $100, whereas they would feel good if they won $100, they wouldn’t feel good enough to make up for the chance of a loss.

In fact, when they asked people how much would you have to win to make this a bet you’d want to take the usual answer is somewhere around twice as much. In other words if I said, “I’ll give you $200 if it comes up heads, you lose $100 if it comes up tails,” then people would want to do that.

Now obviously in any rational terms that’s an incredibly great bet, and you should do whatever you can to get that kind of bet, or even something that was even slightly in your favor. The smart investors, the hedge fund managers, if they can get something where there’s a tiny edge, that’s obviously what they spend their whole careers trying to do.

But when you get to the emotional matter of it, people really do not like losses of any kind. This is something that is very important in investing, because anyone managing other people’s money has to keep in mind that when you do have these inevitable down turns your clients are going to be very unhappy. In situations like that they’re going to want to compare you to what the indexes are doing. If you’re even a little below those indexes they’re going to be very inclined to switch managers. So, it is something of very great practical importance in investing.

Financial advisors obviously go through that process when they meet with the client, or even with an existing client. They do it periodically in trying to assess their risk tolerance. Why is that process so hard? Is it that we don’t necessarily have the language to describe risk? Or is it that investors themselves are just very bad at assessing their own risk? As you speak about this loss aversion, they may not necessarily claim to that when you ask them these types of questions, right?

Poundstone: Yeah, I think risk aversion is one of those sort of interesting fictions, kind of like IQ. I mean there’s certainly a grain of truth to it, but it kind of overlooks the complexity of human nature. I mean we all know that there are very smart people who do dumb things. So, it’s kind of tough to have a single number IQ that tells how smart you supposedly are.

In much the same way it’s very hard to place your risk tolerance on a scale, because one of the things they’ve found is that it’s very, very context dependant.

In a situation where your portfolio is down 50%, almost everyone becomes incredibly less risk tolerant. But in other situations where you see everyone else is making all this money, and everyone is talking about it at cocktail parties, how much money they’ve made, people suddenly decide they’re very risk tolerant.

It really does depend on the situation. It also depends a lot on even how you phrase the questions. So, it’s really a very hard thing to nail down someone’s risk tolerance, and you have to be aware that the actual personality differences from one person to another can actually be less than the differences from like Monday to Tuesday for the same person, depending on what that person has encountered in that particular time.

I’m hearing what you’re saying, and I say the same things to clients, it almost sounds like heresy when I say it, but given the fact that investors have such a hard time really describing or assessing their own tolerance toward risk, do you call into question – should people really be in the stock market, or why they’re approaching the stock market?

Is it sort of just a legalized form of gambling? Are they actually in there with a focus to beat inflation, right? I would say that’s sort of the baseline why people should invest. Given the fact that it’s so hard does that call into question sort of the whole reason why we’re investing?

Poundstone: I mean I think it’s worth asking people those types of questions. Again, you have to realize that you’re not necessarily going to get straight answers. A good example of that- the whole idea of bonds is that they’re supposed to be safe relative to the stock market. If you say, “If you’re investing in treasury bonds you’re guaranteed to get back your principle plus interest,” then everyone says, “Oh, that’s great. There’s no risk. I want that.”

But, another way of explaining that is if you say, “Well, if you take into account inflation, there actually is a pretty good chance that you’re going to end up with less buying power than you had.” If you tell people that then they decide that maybe bonds really aren’t such a good thing.

One of the things that Kahneman and Tversky showed is that in so many of these, even big important decisions, so much depends on how you phrase the question. I think anyone interviewing their clients have to be aware of that. You should probably think about posing questions in different ways to see if you get the same answer in both cases, in many cases you won’t.

In my own practice, given the fact that I’ve become aware of a lot of these sort of human tendencies, I guess I’ve evolved my investing towards sort of a more quantitative methodology, where I’m sort of taking the decision making process out of it. Given these sort of human frailties, do you think that’s necessarily a good thing for investors to do, sort of automate the investment process to some extent?

Poundstone: Yeah, I think there’s a lot to be said for that. I mean if it’s automated and you’ve got a good algorithm for doing that, then you at least avoid all of these human frailties that do really cut into your return. It’s certainly been shown that people are much happier with stocks if they don’t read their account statements every single day and instead every year, or even every couple of years. They’re generally happier to see that there is a steady gain, since you’re more likely to have that if you only look at your account value very infrequently.

Again, it’s a lot of just where your attention is, and what you’re focusing on. Because given that the stock market is very volatile, and because of prospect theory, you’re constantly having these losses relative to what you had the previous day, and that really is something very psychologically draining.

Of course nowadays everyone is constantly connected. A lot of people really do obsess over their current portfolio value. This can be very draining for them, and can cause them to make bad decisions. In answer to you question I would say it is really- that would be the ideal, to try and have some sort of automated, an algorithm that you trusted to make these daily decisions.

You discuss hormonal effects, right?

Poundstone: They’ve found that testosterone actually has a huge effect on how risk tolerant people are, how aggressive they are in their investing and so forth. They’ve found that most of the really successful traders, at least in one study in London, were men who had higher levels of testosterone. It really does affect your decision making.

One question I ask of all guests on the program, because Tradestreaming and what I try to do on the site and through the podcasts is help people discover new ideas, and discover new tools, I ask guests what you use in terms of either researching the stock market, or even how to stay on top of new pricing theory and stuff like that. Are there certain sources that you use in sort of your daily rounds, around the internet, or offline, or whatever, that you find particularly useful that you’d like to share?

Poundstone: I’m really basically just a big believer in rebalancing. I mean I’ve read Swenson’s books. That’s pretty much my gospel.

I figure I really don’t have enough time to get really an informational edge, so I basically rely on index funds and rebalancing them, which I check every week.

What about new sources of information in terms of the core of this book, of pricing? Are there certain blogs, or industry periodicals that you’d recommend?

Poundstone: Yeah, I read basically a lot of the psychology journals. Some of the blogs are very useful. Dan Ariely’s blog I enjoy quite a bit, which is very nicely written. Again, but actually a lot of the psychology stuff, like Psychological Review, there’s one called the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty that really has a lot that pertains to the stock market. I usually find some interesting articles there.

This has been really helpful. I found the book very useful and very interesting. Thanks for participating.

Poundstone: Thank you.

That was Bill Poundstone, the author of Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value (and How to Take Advantage of It). We explored lots of issues in terms of how investors are susceptible to pricing cues, for better and for worse in their investing process. It’s something that all investors should be aware about, and it’s certainly something at Tradestreaming we’re trying to stay on top of as new research comes out, bubbling up some of the new findings in the field.

Love to hear from you if you have any other perspective on this. Bill brought a perspective that was pretty expansive in terms of its wide reaching coverage of the behavioral economics field. He’s a pretty prolific author, and he’s the author of some other books.

Check out the book. It was an interesting read, something that has gained its place on my bookshelf. I hope you enjoyed it. We’ll be back next week.

More resources

Pricing’s influence on investment decisions (podcast)

This episode of Tradestreaming Radio includes a conversation with William Poundstone, author of Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value (and How to Take Advantage of It).

We discuss:

  • market psychology of pricing
  • crowd following and momentum stocks
  • how investors are susceptible to pricing cues
  • what behavioral economics says about risk assessment

Poundstone’s book is a sweeping overview of some of the most influential ideas and people in behavioral economics the past 60 years.  While much ink is devoted to Tversky and Kahneman and their work, the second half of the book takes on a more practical approach in how we can all use the findings of behavioral finance to our benefit.

My interview with Poundstone focuses more on the quirks in the investment process rather than merely looking at consumer behavior.  Tradestreaming is more concerned with how Poundstone’s insights affect our investment behavior, our aversion to trade losses, and our perception of rapidly rising stocks.

We all chase momentum stocks and have a hard time buying real value.  Pricing theory and its place in behavioral economics literature is a small but growing field specifically in the investing vertical.

More resources


Should the government get into the insurance biz?

Well, Professor Terrance Odean, Professor of Finance at UC Berkley, thinks so.

From an Op-Ed in the NYT:

Anyone planning for retirement must answer an impossible question: How long will I live? If you overestimate your longevity, you might scrimp unnecessarily. If you underestimate, you might outlive your savings.

This is hardly a new problem — and yet not a single financial product offers a satisfactory solution to this risk.

We believe that a new product — a federally issued, inflation-adjusted annuity — would make it possible for people to deal with this problem, with the bonus of contributing to the public coffers. By doing good for individuals, the federal government could actually do well for itself.

Prof. Odean thinks the government could actually play the role of Ultimate Backstop.  Annuity buyers pay a premium to an insurance company in return for a “guaranteed” payment stream.  Of course, nothing is guaranteed and investors are subject to default by underwriting insurers.

The U.S. government doesn’t face the same default risk (though theoretically does face some risk).  Here’s how it would work:

  1. investors would enroll in a qualified retirement plan (like a 401k) and choose an annuity option
  2. investors would receive payouts based on a variety of factors like mortality tables and interest rates

Proponents of this product (hey, roll-em up and issue an ETF that tracks them) believe that the Treasury would even benefit from such a plan as it decreases reliance on foreign lenders and expands the domestic investor base.  While I don’t particularly like government meddling, it’s an interesting idea.

Prof Odean is a Tradestreaming favorite and his works have been incorporated into much of my book.  He’s done great, insightful work on investor overconfidence-caused underperformance, overtrading (which is also caused in part by overconfidence), expenses and mutual fund flows.

Source

Paying for Old Age (New York Times) Feb 25, 2011

Humans and Machines Both Reign Supreme: Takeaways from the Battle of the Quants

As markets gyrate, investors continuously hear two diverging voices in their heads.

Matt Dillon (voice of Confidence): Yo, Johnny.  My strategy rocks and I’m in it for the long hall.  I’ve looked over my allocations and they make sense.  I mean, I know what I’m doing here and everything is under control.

Woody Allen (voice of Self-Doubt):  When I began implementing my strategy, I was sure.  Oh, was I sure.  But now?  I dunno.  Am I headed in the right direction? Is volatility too much for me?

Well, the investing kings of the universe also suffer from these opposing forces.  Put differently, quants need to balance the confidence needed to put millions of dollars behind an algorithm they’ve designed and think works versus the fear that if things hit the fan, they’re just a congressional meeting away from notoriety.

Luis Lovas had a great article recounting a meeting that occurred last week, The Battle of the Quants.

The afternoon’s main battle was a panel that pitted a quant team dedicated to automated algorithms against a team that (presumably) considers human discretionary decision making as a better tool for alpha. In other words, like the Jeopardy challenge of IBM’s Watson, it was human vs. machine. That particular event I was completely fascinated by.  An interesting pre-game commentary relates the Jeopardy match to the Singularity by author Ray Kurzwell, a convergence of human and machines.  In the battle pitting algo’s against humans the outcome was decided by an audience vote.  The voting was not simply two choices: “for the machines” or “for humans”, but a third choice was offered more aligned with Ray Kurzwell’s Singularity – “a combination of human and machine decision making”.  As you might have guessed, that third choice was the overwhelming favorite. I believe the majority have the confidence to let machines decide many things but are wanting of human intuition or that proverbial finger on the button as a measure of risk control so fear does not overwhelm.

Kinda like me flying in an airplane.  I know the technology has been good enough for decades to replace a human pilot.  But I’m happy that someone is sitting there.  Just in case.

And hopefully it’s Sully.

And hopefully the pilot is sober.

Source

Confidence and Fear: Why Quantitative Models Win (High Frequency Traders)

Screen your way to profits with new screener

Empirical Finance has launched a simple stock screener for general usage (read, free).  And it’s pretty nice.

In its announcement of the launch of Empirical Finance Data, the company said the site is intended to accomplish a few goals

  • Demystify quantitative long/short.
  • In our mind, the only reason many fund managers can pitch overpriced products to investors, is due to a serious information asymmetry problem. We are here to shakes things up a bit.
  • Currently, the only way to access quantitative long/short equity is via expensive private placement vehicles (e.g., hedge funds), expensive mutual funds, and expensive managed accounts. The key theme across all these vehicles is the following theme, “EXPENSIVE.”
  • Allow “hands-on” investors an opportunity to build straight forward quantitative portfolios using high-quality data via our basic screening tools.

That’s cool for me — that’s what Tradestreaming is all about. Finding the tools, data and research to make more accurate — profitable — investment decisions.  This dovetails nicely into the category we call Stock Screening 2.0 — using technology and proven investment techniques to quantify the investment process.

The screener is super simple and currently sizes stocks up in 4 ways

  1. Joel Greeblatt’s Magic Formula
  2. Piotroski’s F-score
  3. Novy-Marx’s Profit and Value Score
  4. Cooper, Gulen and Schill’s Asset Growth strategy

Users can search for all rankings of an individual stock or screen for the highest ranking stocks in a particular screen according to market cap.  Check it out.

Additional Resources

Empirical Finance Data Services (Empirical Finance Blog)

What is Tradestreaming: Screening 2.0 (Tradestreaming)

Advanced Resources

John Reese’s The Guru Investor: How to beat the market using history’s best investment strategies (Tradestreaming Bookshelf) provides great research for investors interested in creating guru strategies that recreate the types of investments history’s best investors made (guys like Lynch, Buffett, Graham, etc.)

When following the fast money can be a good long term strategy

Stone Street and The_Analyst had an interesting piece yesterday that appeared on Zero Hedge.  Entitled Financial Voyeurism, Why You Can’t Beat Fast Money, the piece took to task all the excitement surrounding hedge fund’s public 13F filings (.pdf) every quarter.

According to Stone Street:

funds and asset managers with greater than $100 million in assets under management are required to report their holdings. The list includes exchange-traded or NASDAQ-quoted stocks, equity options and warrants, shares of closed in funds shares of closed-end investment companies, and certain convertible debt securities. Short positions are NOT included in the 13F. In addition, managers can request confidential treatment of their filing if they feel that their strategy would be compromised by the disclosure. This includes circumstances where the manager has an ongoing acquisition or disposition program. Confidential treatment can last for three months to one year. Lastly, it is important to note that the 13F must be filed no later than 45 days after the end of the quarter. Most funds wait until the deadline to report, as such they are lagging indicators.

The issue is that clearly, investors blindly following 13F followings in an effort to replicate hedge fund portfolios are missing crucial information.  Beyond the lag between buying and filing, not all the fund’s holdings appear in these filings.

So, the incessant race in the blogosphere to analyze these reports for any changes in holdings appears to be somewhat futile.  Fast money momentum players look to piggyback portfolio changes of guru investors in the hope that the market has not fully incorporated this information into current prices.

But, it works

The thing is, with certain investors like Mr Buffett, this strategy actually works.  According to a study I quote in my book, Tradestream, a piggybacking strategy that incorporated only positions included on public filings would achieve alpha close to that of Buffett’s actual portfolio.

The researchers found that Buffett, although touted as the king of value investing, was actually running a growth portfolio.  From Martin and Puthenpurackal’s Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery:

An investor who mimicked the investments from 1976 to 2006 after they were publicly disclosed in regulatory filings would experience statistically and economically significant positive abnormal returns using various empirical tests and benchmarks.  This indicates the market under-reacts to the initial information that Berkshire Hathaway has bought a stock and is slow in incorporating the information produced by a skilled investor.

I understand that Buffett takes larger positions and his holding period is longer than your typical hedge fund.  And that matters.  It would be harder to replicate portfolio performance in a fund like Renaissance that has huge turnover in its portfolio and very short holding periods.

But there are a lot of funds that take bigger, more concentrated positions, like some of the Tiger Cubs, Paulson, Ackman, etc.  Sometimes, even just mimicking a fund’s best idea works.  What these blogs and services are doing in scrambling to reveal and analyzing quarterly filings comes from a good place but needs to be put in context.

Do it, but with class and rigor

I think the point here is not to throw the baby out with the bathwater and poo-poo portfolio replication in general.  On the other hand, mimicking anything that moves — cloning any hedge fund manager — doesn’t make sense either.  That’s dumb money.

What I’ve done after publishing my book is move more and more into rules-based portfolio replication.  But I did it with rigor. I  identified firms that take concentrated positions and hold onto them.  I them backtested them using AlphaClone (see why I called AlphaClone “the cure to investor insanity“) to determine which strategies come closest to mimicking their own performance.  For some funds, it’s their largest holding.  Others performance comes from the largest new holding.  Other positions include the most widely held tech stock, for example.

These portfolios do work but they require vigilance and methodology.   See the performance of one of our portfolios, the Tradestreaming Guru Strategy.

Source

Financial Voyeurism, 13-F Chasers: Why You Can’t Beat the Fast Money (Stone Street Advisors)

Martin and Puthenpurackal: Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway (SSRN)

Cohen, Polk and Silli: Best Ideas (SSRN)

Random Walk’s Malkiel sells out

I first read Princeton U.’s Burton Malkiel when I was in college.  Certainly a best-seller, his 1973 A Random Walk Down Wall Street was as common on a Harvard Econ professor’s shelf as beer pong was in a Dartmouth frat.

For Malkiel, Wall St.’s high priced investment advice was an anathema — investors just couldn’t beat the market, so why try?  Better to invest in low-cost, passive indexes and go out and have fun.

Well, Malkiel is back with the 613th or something printing of Random Walk and in anticipation of the book’s launch, he’s hitting the interview circuit.

Can it be that the Grinch of Wall St has had a change of heart?  In an interview with RegisteredRep, he dropped a whammy:

RR: You write, “You can do as well as the experts — perhaps even better.” That philosophy must drive financial advisors crazy.
BM: In a way, you really need to interpret that. I’ve become frankly more appreciative of what a financial advisor can do. For me, it’s keeping people from beating themselves. Keeping people on an even keel. It’s easier said than done. It’s very hard work.

I’m sort of an informal financial advisor for all of the Princeton widows. I remember so many of them would come in with tears in their eyes in the third quarter of 2008 when it looked like the world was falling apart — “and I have to sell all of my equities!” That’s what I mean by keeping people on an even keel.

Either he’s hankering for a new job or he just really knows his audience.

Source

Malkiel: Wall St. Has Caught Up to Random Walk (RegisteredRep)

Best practices for equity research analysts (new podcast)

james valentine and analyst training

In this week’s episode of Tradestreaming Radio, we interview James Valentine, author of the new book, Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts: Essentials for Buy-Side and Sell-Side Analysts.

Jim brings a ton of information and experience into the only book I know of that addresses the business of being an equity researcher, whether on the sell side or buy side.  But beyond that, this book is about the art and science of professional investing.

We discuss:

  • the need for stock researchers to sharpen organizational skills
  • killer apps to monitor stocks
  • “food chain analysis”
  • how analysts communicate in the age of social media, and a lot more

Listen to the FULL Program


I really enjoyed this book because it fills a gap in the literature, not only in terms of how to research stocks professionally, but also how to manage the practice of being a professional researcher.

Jim has a lot of his history and on the job experience built into this book. It’s as much a book about investing as it is the business of investing. I think it was a fantastic read. I recommend it. And, I hope that you’ll find this interview very engaging.  Check out the transcript to dig in.

More Resources

Learn more about the book and Jim Valentine

Best practices for equity research analysts (transcript)

This transcript is of a conversation I had with James Valentine, author of Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts: Essentials for Buy-side and Sell-side Analysts.

Miller: Hi! I’m Zack Miller, author of the recent book TradeStream Your Way to Profits: Building a Killer Portfolio in the Age of Social Media, and you’re listening to Tradestreaming Radio, our home in the internet radio space. This is our place to discuss how technology is helping investors to become better, smarter, and more accurate at what they do.

You can find this podcast on iTunes. You can also find lots of other material relating to this podcast, as well as archives of our programs at my website www.tradestreaming.com There’s lots of other great content there as well, and I recommend you check it out.

We’ve got a great interview set up today. Joining us will be James Valentine, CFA, who’s the author of the recent Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts: Essentials for Buy-side and Sell-side Analysts. He’s the founder of Analysts Solutions: providing best practices, training and career advancement services for equity research analysts. He’s held a number of roles at four of Wall Street’s largest firms, including most recently Morgan Stanley, where he was Associate Director of North American Research, as well as the director of training for the firm’s global research department.

He was also an established research analyst where for ten consecutive years he was ranked by the major Wall Street institutional investor polls as one of the top three analysts in his sector.

I really enjoyed this book because it fills a gap in the literature, not only in terms of how to research stocks professionally, but also how to manage the practice of being a professional researcher.

Jim has a lot of his history and on the job experience built into this book. It’s as much a book about investing as it is the business of investing. I think it was a fantastic read. I recommend it. And, I hope that you’ll find this interview very engaging.

First up I asked Jim to tell us a little bit about his background.

Valentine: I started in the industry in the early ‘90s on the sell side. I started at Paine Webber and did that for about a year and a half as brand new out of grad school. I had a Master’s in finance.

After doing that I got an offer to go over to Smith Barney and be the senior analyst. So, I went and did that. I did that for about a year and a half. I had a lot of fun and learned a lot. Because I was a senior analyst I really didn’t have a mentor.

Then Salomon Brothers called at the time. I went over there. I was there for about three years. There is where I really started get my sea legs and kind of understand how to do the job, and work with clients, and do higher quality research.

Then Morgan Stanley called- this was in 1998, early ‘98. I went over there. I was there as an analyst for about eight years. Then I was getting burned out. I had been an analyst for fourteen years at that point. I said, “I want to do something else.” I moved into the global management team, where I did a number of things, but among those was worked on training development for the research department, which got about 1,000 employees globally.

I moved to London and I really enjoyed it, because when I was an analyst I was kind of known within the department for helping younger talent develop and I tried to do mentoring and those types of things to help these people succeed. So, I did this on a global basis. I enjoyed it. I did that for about two years.

Somewhere in the middle of that I came back to New York, and became the number two guy in the equity research department, in terms of management. I enjoyed that, although we started going through a lot downsizing in 2008. It became really just kind of frustrating watching the budget get cut, which was happening across all of Wall Street.

After a few rounds of that I just got frustrated with dismantling a department that I was trying to build, and decided I was going to retire. After that, after about I’d say four or five months I decided that I wanted to write a book, and kind of help the next generation of analysts to take all this stuff that I had collected throughout my career and put it in a place where the next generation of analysts could learn from it.

Obviously a lot of the information within the book was on the job stuff that you picked up. Did you write this book more for incoming analysts? Somebody that aspires to be an analyst? Or somebody on the job who hasn’t necessarily been mentored, or learned the things that you did along the way?

Valentine: It’s kind of both in the sense that… the primary target was to somebody who’s right out of grad school, or college, or maybe a year into the job. If they were to read the book hopefully they would get something out of almost every section of it. But there’s also parts of it for more senior analysts who want to brush up, or improve on things.

One thing I learned as an analyst, and then also when I was managing a department of analysts, is that you never have every element of being an analyst perfect. There’s going to be some element of your job that you could do better. So, the book has some of the more advanced sections, which kind of start probably a third to halfway into the book, that could be valuable to even someone who’s been doing the job for let’s say ten years, because it just kind of gives you- it tries to give you a framework to think about how to approach all the different facets of the job.

One of the things that I picked up when reading through the book, again, I don’t have experience on the sell side. I was more on the buy side. But it was every bit as much about investing as it is about the business of being an analyst. Was that sort of what you sort of envisioned?

Valentine: It is. I wasn’t trying to create an every man’s investment book, but obviously being you’re a research analyst a big part of the job is successfully investing. I delved into that. I tried to approach it from a different perspective then what you might see out there in some other books, namely. There’s a lot written on evaluation. I think if you Google it, or go to Amazon you’ll see there’s like over 10,000 books on evaluation. Obviously there’s tens of thousands of books on investing.

What I was trying to do was approach it from a real practical perspective, namely, what do analysts really do day to day? Like I said, I got a Master’s in finance and I thought when I got to Wall Street that I’d conquer all of my competitors because I had all this academic knowledge.

What I realized is that a lot of it wasn’t really applied day to day in the job. So, when writing the book I said I’m only going to talk about things that people can really apply day to day. Like, there’s a lot of focus on how to use the P/E ratio and some of the downsides of the P/E ratio, whereas in academia they focus so much on discounted cash flows.

So, yeah. I try to make it as- I try to focus some element of discussion on investments, but really focusing on keeping it practical.

So, let’s talk about practicality. Obviously the title of the book is Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts, can you give us a couple?

Valentine: Sure. Well, I think starting off, and it’s a real simple one, but it’s understanding time management. And you might say, “Well, what does that have to do with investing?” But when you think about the research job- I like to say it’s similar to saying you went to the library and you read all the books. I mean it’s just- there’s no physical way you can do it. So, you have to prioritize.

Time management is really all about prioritizing your time, trying to figure out what’s really important, and then focusing your day on that.

When I look across analysts that I trained, analysts that I worked with, that I managed, if I had to say what’s the single biggest problem with the success, it’s not intelligence. It’s not drive. It’s the inability to manage their day, all the distractions, interruptions that they’ve had.

One of the best practices, candidly, is to take a one day time management class. There’s two firms out there that do this; Getting Things Done is one, and the other is the Franklin Covey Focus. And, by the way I’m not getting any reimbursement. I have no financial connection to these firms. But, I’ve always recommended- in fact I’ve made my new people who have worked for my team, I always make them go and take one of  these one day courses, and it helped so much on their time management skills. So, that’s one thing.

I think another thing that may be getting more into the investment arena, in terms of best practice, is to identify the two to four critical factors that impact every one of your stocks. This kind of goes back into the time management thing. What I find is that there are a lot of really smart analysts who know a lot about other companies, but they don’t have a differentiated view from consensus on any particular issues that are going to drive the stock. Ultimately they become a company analyst, rather than a stock analyst.

So the best practice, in effect, is to do some research, figure out what are those two to four critical factors, and then focus all your time on those for your companies, as opposed to all the other factors out there that are, in effect, noise.

Why do you think so many investors get that, what you call materiality, wrong? Obviously the media does, because the media doesn’t necessarily know how to size those up correctly, at least as a stock analyst, not as a company analyst. Why is that so hard for investors?

Valentine: I think, at least the way I saw a lot of analysts, both sell side and buy side, approach their job was kind of a CYA mindset, that they had to make sure that any piece of news that came out on their stock, whether it be the newswires, or it be a sell side piece of work, they felt like they had to at least take a look at it. If you’re trying to do that all day long- let’s say you’re following twenty stocks on the sell side, or fifty stocks on the buy side, if you’re trying to pay attention to every piece of material that comes out during the day, that’s all you’re going to be doing is basically reacting to news.

The constant of being a really good stock picker is to figure out, proactively, how you differentiate from consensus, and find a place where you differentiate from consensus. Well, you can’t proactively go and do proprietary research if you’re spending- which by the way, I think if you’re doing this proactive work- I call that doing research offensively- that you can’t do the offensively type research if you’re spending all day doing defense and be trying to read the news tape and trying read every consumer thing out there.

Nobody wants to be caught off guard. Nobody wants their boss to come in and say, “Hey, piece of news just got announced on this company, why don’t you have a view on it?” Or, “What is your view on it?” And then you’ve got to scrabble to figure it out. But the reality is that I’d say at least eight out of ten, even nine out ten of those pieces of information have no impact on moving a stock. So, the analyst shouldn’t spend much time focused on that, or any time for that matter. They need to focus on those two to four critical factors.

It’s tough to shift your mindset because you are going to be in a situation in where on the buy side your portfolio manager is going to ask you a question, and you won’t have the answer, because it’s something that’s trivial, and you haven’t focused on it. On the sell side you’re going to have a client that’s going to ask you something, and you’re going to say, “I don’t know the answer,” because it’s in effect trivial. But the good news is you will have the answers on the key things that are really important, that are going to move the stocks.

So, in terms of gauging what’s critically important, in the book you described Google News Alerts as killer apps for analysts. Can you explain why?

Valentine: Sure, well, specifically about the killer apps, it’s fine tuning your news alerts and also to some extent any other kind of email alerts that you have, anything that you’ve got that alerts you to what’s going on. As analyst the killer app here is creating filters, because as you know, there’s hundreds, if not thousands, if not millions of pieces of information coming out everyday, and you want to filter it down to make sure that you’re not getting distracted by noise, but that you are picking up the information that is going to potentially help you on those two to four critical factors for everyone of your stocks.

What I try to go into on the killer app is that as an analyst you have to always be fine tuning these news filter, or the Google filters, or Google news alerts, whatever it is, you’ve always got to be going in there fine tuning these, because you’re going to find that if you go too far you’re going to wind up with too much noise. You’re going to be getting three hundred pieces of information. You’ve got to read it. That’s too much.

On the other hand if you go too restrictive you’re going to miss key pieces of information about your industry. But if you do it right you’re going to be getting it might be ten, it might be twenty, it might be fifty alerts a day on key things that you want to be looking at that are ultimately going to help you have a differentiated view from consensus, without having information overload.

Jim just brings a huge repertoire to the whole professional investing process. And part of the book really looks at how professional investors should size up companies and industries. So, in the next part of the interview I asked Jim about some of the techniques that he describes in the book.

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So one of the things that I found, as a new buy side analyst, I really cut my teeth on the job, was just something that you talked about, and you call ‘food chain analysis’, where you’re trying to understand the entire sort of value chain within an industry. Particularly for new industry it takes time to sort of drilldown and figure out how that works. Why is food chain analysis so important in being able to have an opinion on the stock?

Valentine: I think that we get caught up in our sectors based on what’s assigned to us, based on very often it’s the GICS sectors, or S&P sectors, and these create these silos, these artificial silos, that make it tough to really see a difference in terms of having a different view about something relative to consensus.

I’ll give an example. If you’re following the airline industry you’re likely not responsible for Boeing ($BA), which is an aircraft manufacturer, and you’re not going to be responsible for a leasing company that leases aircraft, that’s more of a financial services company. So, you’re not going to know those two other companies, unless you go out of your way to do this food chain analysis where you understand the upstream and downstream effects.

And, those analysts who take that extra time, they are more likely to discover some critical factors that are going to move the stock that the Street is not going to pick up on.

In this day and age of post Reg FD, we’re seeing now a crack down on some of the primary expert networks, it seems that it’s getting harder and harder necessarily to find that critical information. In the book you talked about triangulating, or mosaic theory, and what analysts need to do to be able to sort of piece the investment puzzle together.

Are you finding that it’s becoming harder within the industry to get this type of information? How do you consult with analysts to be able to sort of overcome some of the new obstacles?

Valentine: It’s definitely harder than pre- Reg FD, but candidly, I as an analyst liked when Reg FD came in place, because I had been doing a lot of really in-depth fundamental research on proprietary surveys. I had my own proprietary contacts. And, so it was frustrating when I knew that one of my competitors could just make a phone call to a CEO, or CFO, or control of a company and get kind of an understanding of what the quarter was going to be. Meanwhile I had spent all this time, and he got the same piece of information.

So, I guess what I’m trying to get at is for analysts to do the hard work, the deep work, the research, having more and more of these regulations and requirements is a good thing, because presumably this extra research is going to actually give them an edge and help them generate some alpha.

But conversely because middle managers are less likely to talk about things, and it is harder to get information, you have to follow fewer stocks. Studies have shown that analysts over the last ten-fifteen years are following fewer and fewer stocks.

I don’t know what that magic number is, but I talked a little about it in the book, it feels like having about seven stocks per team member on the sell side is about the right coverage, and having somewhere between thirty and fifty stocks on the buy side is about the right number. Those numbers are lower than they would have been ten or fifteen years ago, partly because of the restriction on how much information you can get from people.

That’s so interesting. One thing that I found when I was reading through the book is that- you focus very much on sort of the persona of a professional analyst, what it takes to become an analyst, to be a successful analyst. Some of the things that sort of hit me when I was reading through the chapters was that behavioral finance continues to sort of bubble up sort of the short comings of mankind, particularly in the investment field. And, certainly professionals are subject to those same sort of short comings. They’re sort of embedded within human nature.

So, how can some professionals, or aspiring professional investors sort of avoid the same pitfalls that afflict the rest of us?

Valentine: I guess there’s a few thoughts. One is, and you may have seen there’s a chapter in there, how to avoid the psychological pitfalls, those are more inherent, and those are going to be inherent for anybody regardless of their personality.

The other is that I guess being more self-aware, and self-awareness is a skill that you have to work on. There has been work done in the past, academic work done in the past to try to identify investment styles. They show that if you’re- there’s two scales. One to do with whether you’re very careful, or you’re very impetuous. And the other scale is whether you’re very confident, or you’re very anxious.

What they’ve shown and discussed makes a lot of sense from a practitioner’s perspective, that if you’re too careful, and if you’re too anxious at those ends of the spectrums that you’re never going to pull the trigger and make a decision, because even the best analysts and portfolio managers know that you’ll never have 100% of the information to make the call on stock.

On the other hand if you’re too confident and you’re too impetuous when you’re making stock calls you’re going to wind up out there making too many stock calls that aren’t well-based, fact-based. They’re not bound by the research from real good work.

As an analyst you have to kind of find that sweet spot, that you’re willing to take a little bit of risk, maybe even more than a little bit of risk if you’re at a shop where they want you to take more risk, but not willing to take so much risk that you have stocks that are huge blow-ups, and hopefully if they do blow up it’s not because of sloppy research. It’s because of something that just couldn’t have been foreseen.

My first boss when I was at the hedge fund, as I was an incoming analyst, sort of gave me a library of books and other types of information I needed to read through just to kind of get up to speed. I remember one book he gave me, which sort of surprised me, besides the Jim Cramer book that he gave me, was a book on technical analysis.

You devoted a section in the book to technical analysis. So, I’m just curious sort of- it was my experience that people either fell in either camp. Either you’re a fundamental analyst, or a technical one. And you sort of see the intersection of those two. Can you talk about how you use that in your stock picking, and how you recommend analysts to use technical analysis?

Valentine: Sure. Very early on in my career, I’d say it was within a few months of taking the job, I actually started talking a little bit about technical analysis to my boss. He said something along the lines of- he said, “Do you know what we’re going to do? We’re going to cut open the chicken’s liver and we’ll see which way the blood flows to decide whether we’re going to go war.” I think that dates back to either the Romans or the Greek in terms of, you know, I guess some superstitious ways of going to battle.

And there are people out there that believe that typical analysis is a bit of witchcraft or superstition. What I hope- what I’m trying to do with fundamental analysts is to say there’s definitely some benefit. It helps you to understand the psychology of the stock. It gives you another dimension. And it’s not that overly complicated, meaning it doesn’t takes months and months to learn this stuff. And, I think it’s helpful.

So, what I did is I partnered up with Barry Sign [assumed spelling], he’s a well regarded professional who’s a technical analyst, and he has some experience as a fundamental analyst as well, and we tried to write it from a practitioner’s prospective.

When I was analyst, and specifically when I was at Morgan Stanley, we had a technician who would help us. So, first we had to get the fundamental call right. And by the way I heard this over and over again, I interviewed 75 people for the book and a number of them said the they always would require the fundamental analysis to be done first, and then you can look at the technical analysis.

Basically if you say, “Look, I’m about ready to upgrade the stock, because of these fundamentals. I think consensus is too low,” you can then go to the technical numbers and charts, and say, “What is it telling me? Is it telling me that this thing is ready to break out? Is it telling me that the stock has been oversold, or maybe it’s been overbought?” So, what we’re were trying to do is say, “Look, this is one more tool to your toolbox. It shouldn’t be this single method you used to try to pick stocks. It can give you a competitive advantage.”

We always used it sort of exactly the way you described. Like, “Go do the work on the stocks, speak to as many people as you can. Make sure you get the numbers right,” and then look at the chart for really timing on the call, right? To try to, like, at least put it into context with the stock price movement as opposed to just making outright call off of a chart.

Valentine: Exactly. And one thing Barry really taught me, and I guess I learned somewhat on the job, is that technical analysis will never spot the infliction point before it happens, whereas in fundamental work we’d like to think that we can figure something out before the rest of the Street and get in while the stock is cheap, and then it ultimately starts to move and we look like heroes.

In the technical world the stock has to start to move. Things have to start to go in a certain trend before you can say, “OK, the trend is starting here, now we can get on it.” And, I think that’s a little bit of a mind shift for a fundamental analyst to say, “Hey, wait. The trend is already starting, and now I’m getting on,” but very often the trend will continue, as we discussed in the book.

Can you talk about one of those instances in your career, whether it was you directly or somebody you were managing where you got it right? Where you went in, you did the work, you sort of went against the Street and stuck your neck out on a call and got it right?

Valentine: Yeah, I’d say probably one of the highest profile calls I had was on- I guess the one we’re talking about is on Union Pacific ($UNP), and I guess it just helps illustrate the whole point of doing fundamental work.

At the time in this whole food chain analysis- Union Pacific is railroad, and they haul all kinds of chemicals. The chemical analyst at our firm was saying, “Hey, I’m hearing of some trouble.” This by the way was ten years ago, so it’s not a current issue with Union Pacific. He said, “I’m hearing of some trouble with chemical shippers in Union Pacific.”

I had heard there was going to be a shipper meeting down in Houston, so I got on a plane, flew down there. It was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, so it wasn’t necessarily the place I wanted to be. And there were like 300 shippers in this ballroom that were just hopping mad with the service. What it made me realize was that the company was really struggling with the acquisition they had done prior to that, six months earlier.

Ultimately they went negative on the stock. I think most people, including myself, had been fairly [inaudible; 0:25:03] at that point. The stock collapsed and had major problems for the following year.

I guess my point is it was due to getting out in the field and actually doing some fundamental research, as opposed to trying to just read the news tape and have a differentiated view.

There is a give and take there though, right? Between being too much in the field or too much in the office? Right? It seems to me like to be successful at what you do you’d have to- in either way you’re sort of influenced by your surroundings, right? So, how do you sort of balance that as a analyst?

Valentine: Yeah, I don’t know that I’ve ever met someone who felt like they were out of the office too much, or that they did a bad job. If anything I think that I would say over the years the people who I met who were the best at their job were the people that would be most willing to get on a plane and go somewhere.

To your point, you can’t spend 52 weeks of the year on the road, although with laptops nowadays, and mobile phones, smart phones, and everything else, there’s no reason from a technology perspective why you couldn’t. But you’re right, to the extent that you need to be working, communicating with your colleagues and making sure that your ideas are being put in the portfolio, or on the sell side that your clients are adopting your ideas.

But I guess on the whole point I would say the more an analyst, especially in the first five years of their career, the more an analyst is out on the road the greater the likelihood they’re going to do high quality work, assuming they’re using their time proactively. I mean going to some far remote place to meet one company for two hours and spending the whole day and that’s all they do is a problem, but if they can be working remotely on their laptop and keeping news flow and doing some research while they’re traveling, I think that actually helps analysts out a lot.

Let’s just reaffirm this a little bit, within the book, and obviously as an outsider looking into the industry, technology obviously is changing our inputs in terms of where we’re getting our information, and the speed of information.

What’s interesting for a sell side analyst is that’s only one side of the business. The other side of the business is obviously communicating your ideas.

How have you seen technology sort of transform how analysts are helping to disseminate their ideas?

Valentine: Well, I’ll maybe just punch out that the buy side I really haven’t seen much difference because almost in all instances it’s in-house. But on the sell side it’s clearly been-

Although that’s not exactly true. I don’t know if you saw like last month Whitney Tilson who was short Netflix ($NFLX) went very public with that short. The CEO of Netflix came onto Seeking Alpha. There was this back and forth between why- basic premises on sort of the thesis there. So, I’ve seen successful hedge fund guys now go to the media- I mean this is an age old issue, but it’s happening faster and I think more frequently that buy side guys are going out making their portfolio picks public.

Valentine: Yeah, that’s a really good point. There are some- I’m not sure how big of a population it is, but there’s definitely some I guess more activist type investors, specifically hedge funds, that are willing to go out and get their message out there.

So, you’re right. That absolutely happens.

But when I think about technology transforming the way- communication of stock messages- I tend to think more of the sell side in that there still is this regulatory concern, and rightfully so, that you have to disseminate all material information to all your clients at the same time.

We like to think that, “Well, great. Now you’ve got instant messaging, and you can use your smart phone to do all these things, communicate your ideas as an analyst,” but the reality is that as a sales analyst you’re going to go out and share an idea that is material you’ve got to get it out there to everybody, which means you’ve first got to write at least a short note, have it go through legal, your compliance, and then ultimately it gets sent out.

But the good news is that when it gets sent out now it can go out to smart phones, it can go out via the web. I remember fifteen or twenty years ago, starting off you had to have a dedicated first call machine, and you had to like walk over to it and use it for your whole department to pull up any new information that was coming up out of the sell side.

Now it’s ubiquitous. You can get this anywhere in the world, assuming you’re a [inaudible; 0:29:37] client of the sell side firm, you can get the research, and so yeah. It definitely had a big impact. Information is disseminated so quickly that as an analyst if you get something, a few pieces of information, you’ve got to move very quickly on that.

Ten or fifteen years ago you could say, “Let me spend another day, or two, or three, really double checking and making sure I’ve got all this understood.” But nowadays with so many eyes out there that have access to ultimately the media, they’re all going to self-publish what they discover, that you don’t have that luxury, as much of a luxury to wait.

I guess I’m colored obviously because of where I sit, and sort of the media side of things, but I sort of see analysts, both on the sell side and on the buy side, becoming more and more media type personalities, as time unfolds. Are they getting training internally or externally, in terms of how to manage messaging, like, when they’re on a live show, like on CNBC, or speaking to reporters?

Valentine: It really depends on the firm. Some firms have very strict policies and say only certain level- vice president or managing director and above- can talk to the media, and they need full blown training. Other firms are more flexible, and their attitude is, “You can talk to anybody you want.” That, by the way, is on the sell side. On the buy side my experience has been only the most senior people are allowed to have these discussions and they very often do get media training.

This is a weird questions, but I ask this of all the guests on my radio program- what do you do during your day? What sources of information do you find useful, as an analyst? What would you recommend to analysts of sources of information? Books to read, things like that. I just like to help bubble those up for our readership.

Valentine: Sure, now are you talking about to do day to day research on a particular stock, or are you saying to get smarter, to be a better analyst?

Both.

Valentine: Well, I think in day to day research I think that the- there’s two elements for your sectors, or your companies, and that is there’s obviously the newswires and the print media you’ve got to keep an eye on, and once again hopefully you’re only focusing on the things that are really likely to impact your stock.

Then there’s the more specific trade journals and things that are in your sector, and unfortunately, because it’s sector specific I can’t necessarily give you names, but every analyst out there better have at least one or two industry-specific trade journals that they find useful, that they’re scanning periodically, otherwise they’re going to miss on the trends. They’re going to have to wait until the general media picks up on them.

In terms of how to be a better analyst, obviously I wouldn’t have wrote the book if I didn’t think that there was a hole there. So, I do think that’s one of the ways, obviously.

But, there are some books on evaluation. Unfortunately a lot of them are fairly academic.

Professor Damodaran from NYU has got two or three books out there that I think are very good. He is looking at them from more of somewhat academic, but he has more of a practitioner’s vent than I’ve seen from a lot of other authors.

I think on the buy side, obviously priorities are different whether you’re on the buy side or sell side, but buy side is consuming every type of media you can possibly think of, right? They’re on Twitter, and they’re mining that to try to find any morsels that may move stocks, or that maybe pertinent to a particular thesis.

Are sell side guys also sort of attune to some of the changes in the consumption of media now? Or are they still sort of innoculated from that?

Valentine: It really depends on the person, and this kind of goes back to part of the reason I wrote the book, is that every analyst out there is allowed to kind of adopt whatever practice they want. I would say if you find- most analysts who are on the job that are 30, or maybe 35 is the right age, threshold and older, not convinced that they’re all out there mining Twitter, or any of the other social media to try to stay ahead, but I would say most analysts under the age of 30 are probably trying to do those things.

The key thing though, and this goes back twenty years, at least, as far as I know in my career, there is always something that comes out that people think is going to be the panacea, that’s going to be, “Here’s the place to find the good information.” And the reality is that you have to filter it down to what’s really relevant to you. Then once you filter that down you’ve got to figure out, “Well, is this really going to impact my stock, and if so what’s the magnitude,” and then do the research.

It’s kind of going back to when we were talking about killer apps, this idea that using social media, and this is more your area than mine, but using social media is clearly important, but you’ve got to be able to harness it, so you’re not sitting there for eight hours a day scanning things defensively, and not really doing your job, namely, getting out there and proactively being on offensive and trying to figure out how you can have a differentiated view. Because if it’s already out there in social media it’s out there, and you’re not necessarily going to be able to make a big difference.

Just lastly, in terms of building that differentiated view that you talk so much about, you talk about this innerplay this communication between the buy side and the sell side. Obviously each one is looking for something different from each other, but when we were at the hedge fund we definitely found this sort of dream team of sell side analyst from different firms that we reach out to for different things that we felt had a really valuable perspective for us when we were building our thesis.

Can you talk a little bit about that, about how to use each other I guess to sort of harness the different perspectives in terms of finding out where stocks are going to go?

Valentine: Sure. Well, in terms of the buy side using sell side, one of the thing I think every analyst should do before they start calling around and figuring out who their favorite analyst is going to be is to look at the numbers. Starmine does a really good job of this. I believe Factset and Bloomberg also have methods to evaluate analysts on two dimensions, both their stock picking skills, as well as their earning accuracy.

There’s a number of studies that have shown that the analysts who are more accurate with their earnings estimates are also better with their stock picks. So, figure out who in your industry ranks on that scale, and use it as a foundation, and then start making the phone calls.

Look, the buy side might use a sell side analyst because he/she has a great relationship with the CEO, or because they’ve got a great historical perspective. So, I’m not saying only use people based on the statistics, but know when you’re going to call someone, if you begin to develop a relationship, that they are number 9th in the industry in terms of stock picking skills, because you only have so much time to invest in each relationship. You can’t be friends- not friends- but not necessarily have a good, strong working relationship with ten analysts in every sector. It’s probably going to come down to two or three.

Then on the sell side in terms of relationships you do on the buy side, part of this is getting clients to vote for you and say they like your work, because that ultimately results in commissions, which is ultimately how sell side analysts, their firms are paid.

But there’s also the factor of sell side analysts should make sure they’re staying close to the smartest buy side analysts, because it makes them smarter. It makes them better. It definitely helps them understand the psychology of the stock. There’s a number of places in the book where I talk about the only way you’re going to really know whether you differ from consensus is to understand consensus.

Consensus isn’t necessarily just the number that’s out there for the quarterly earnings, or the annual earnings. Very often consensus can be a whisper number. It could be the psychology behind whether a company is going to get a new patent, whether they’re going to get drug approval. And, the only way you know what that consensus is, is to get out there and talk to some of the smart investors. So, point being that I think the sell side always needs to make an effort to stay close to smart buy side clients.

Smart buy side clients, they don’t always wind up being in the biggest commission paying firms. So, sometimes you have relationships with these people that are in smaller firms, but they hopefully make you smart.

I also, just harkening back to something you said, I definitely feel that there was a void in the industry and that your book definitely fills this need that there isn’t this sort of overarching publication that tells people how to be better at their job. I know it’s sort of a sink or swim very competitive industry, where you sort of just learn on the job or you don’t. I just want to commend you on putting together a really sort of end to end book that I think addresses the entire business in a very practical way.

Reading the book, I appreciate your time today. This has been very intuitive for me.

Valentine: Well, thank you.

Miller: Good luck.

That was Jim Valentine, the author of a new book, Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts: Essentials for Buy-side and Sell-side Analysts. It’s put out by McGraw-Hill. You can find it on Amazon. I’ll link to it from my blog as well.

Check out my blog at www.tradestreaming.com You’ll find an archive of all of our previous podcasts, and conversations with new authors, discussions about using technology to become better, more accurate, more profitable investors. Thanks for joining us. I hope you’ll drop us a line, let us know what you think of the podcast. And I hope you’ll listen next week.

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