This transcript is of a conversation I had with Stephen Weiss (listen to the podcast), author of the newish book, Billion Dollar Mistake: Learning the Art of Investing Through the Missteps of Legendary Investors.
Miller: Hi! I’m Zack Miller, author of the recent book TradeStream Your Way to Profits: Building a Killer Portfolio in the Age of Social Media, and you’re listening to Tradestreaming Radio, our home in the internet radio space. This is our place to discuss how technology is helping investors to become better, smarter, and more accurate at what they do.
You can find this podcast on iTunes. You can also find lots of other material relating to this podcast, as well as archives of our programs at my website www.tradestreaming.com There’s lots of other great content there as well, and I recommend you check it out.
We’ve got a great interview for today. We have Stephen Weiss, who’s the author of The Billion Dollar Mistake: Learning the Art of Investing Through the Missteps of Legendary Investors. I found Stephen’s perspective interesting with a illustrious career on Wall Street, on the sell side.
Stephen took the opposite side, the other side of the trade in terms of looking at how famed investors make money, and this is by looking at their mistakes.
He profiles guru investors like Bill Ackman, Omega’s Leon Cooperman, Aubrey McClendon, who is the CEO of Chesapeake, who leveraged himself to the hilt to buy millions of shares of his own company.
All in all, the book was a very good read. It was not only a window into the insights of legendary investors, but Stephen’s whole perspective was to be able to take from these great investors, learn from them, and be able to implement some of their missteps, correcting them in our own investing.
As always, I hope you enjoy this interview, this one with Stephen Weiss, the author of The Billion Dollar Mistake, and I welcome your feedback and comments at the website.
[music]
Weiss: I got into the business on the sell side in 1986, at Oppenheimer, originally in the trading desk, and then moved into sales. Covered, at that time, a mixture of hedge funds and long only accounts. Hedge funds weren’t as popular, or as vast as they are now.
And from there, moved on to eventually Salomon Brothers in sales, also covered the big funds, Soros, Tiger, Kingdon, Omega, as well again some big long only funds.
Salomon itself was a great experience. From there they asked me to come down to research, and I co-headed the global and US equity research department. We had about 500 people around the world. That was the heyday, the go-go years of the analyst, the Jack Grubmans of the world. Another interesting time.
One of the accounts I also covered in sales was SAC Capital. Steve Cohen asked me to come over and manage his firm for him, which I did. Eventually left there, still maintained good relationship with Steve; some of the smartest people I have ever met in the business.
I went to Lehman Brothers, Lehman had just come out of a troubled period. I ran their sales effort, research sales globally. And built the firm up, was one of the key people building the firm from an equity division loss that had 500 million revenues, losing money hand over fist, to, when I left, 3 billion in revenues, and very profitable. Left there in ’02.
Eventually started my own fund, and did well, but split with my partner at the time, and once one person leaves you sort of have to give them their money back, or give them the option. Retired, and then went to a smaller firm on the sell side. We had a bunch of different businesses, so I ran the trading, sales, and research.
Then retired again, wrote a book, which we are talking about now. I have two more books in the works, a novel, and under contract with Wiley to write another book, also appear on CNBC about twice a week on Fast Money, as an exclusive contributor to them, and actively manage my own portfolio.
Great. Very illustrious career, so why write a book?
Weiss: Writing had always been an interest of mine, and I first started writing a book, a novel, and the agent who read it said, “I love your writing, but what about writing an investment book?” I said, “Yeah, I just don’t want to write another investment book.”
And we kicked around and idea over a three hour lunch, which was The Billion Dollar Mistake, which we didn’t believe anybody had ever done. As an investment professional I knew learning from my mistakes was as important as learning from my wins. Actually more important, I thought. And put it together.
It was part to show my kids that if you put your mind to something and do it, and get a book published when it’s very, very difficult, particularly with a quality publisher such as Wiley. And enjoyed it, you know, just something else to do.
It’s a great story. I want to riff off a little bit why you think, it’s obviously a novel approach to take an investing book, and look at the mistakes that famed investors have made. What do you learn more from looking at mistakes than maybe looking at successful trades?
Weiss: Well, what I found through my career and observing others is that the best investors I ever got to know, the one’s I covered through my career, and I think I have covered a hall of fame of investment professionals, was that they spent more time dissecting their mistakes so they wouldn’t repeat them, than dissecting the victories, the winning investments. They seem to resonate more, and they are much more aggravating. When you make money on stock, or on an investment theme, you pat yourself on the back and say, “OK, let’s move on.”
You do have your discipline, and you follow that discipline, but when you make a mistake it really resonates because it has cost you money. And whether it’s blow to your ego, or a blow to your wallet, generally it’s both, you want to make sure you don’t do it again. It’s, “How can I be so stupid? How did I do that?” If you can keep that mental list, or in some cases, like I do a written checklist, and say, “You know what? I’m not going to do that again, I found it’s made me money by not costing me money.”
I think that’s so interesting, so insightful. As I was reading through the book, and I was thinking about the approach, a lot of times, successful trades, it’s unclear whether they are based on skill or on luck, you know? But at least with a losing trade, you now have an opportunity to say, “Hey, what went wrong? How could I have been more skillful in that trade?”
Weiss: Yeah. Absolutely right, and mistakes, if you can take the mistakes out of your process, you do well. It’s no different than we just saw in the Super Bowl. So, guess what? The team that won made fewer mistakes. Steelers turned it over, interceptions, fumbles. Green Bay was mistake free, essentially, so they came out on top. I don’t think it’s any different in investing.
So, can we talk about some of those famous large mistakes that you write about?
Weiss: Sure.
OK. Do you want to pick out one that you find is particularly, I guess insightful?
Weiss: Yes, one that’s very typical is leverage. Where you borrow, where a retailer or an institutional investor will borrow against their equity that they have in the account, in an effort to goose the returns.
But leverage cuts both ways. So when you put on too much leverage, you really back yourself into a corner if things go wrong, because you don’t have the freedom of choice anymore. Somebody is taking that decision out of your hands. So your ability to stay with it, in case it turns, is very limited.
For example, if you take a look at what happened with Nick Maounis and Amaranth. He got way too big in the natural gas trade, and borrowed to increase his position there.
There were two mistake there; number one, he got bigger than the market, which means that his position was outsized. Everybody knew he had it, and there was an inability to find the exit door, and get through it himself because everybody was shooting against him. That’s number one, so bigger than the market.
And number two, he had too much leverage. So he borrowed too much to put that position on. Leverage is what hedge funds do. If you take a look at most hedge funds, they don’t just invest the equity that they have in their accounts. They borrow against it, and what that allows you to do, of course, and you know this as well as I do, is that if you are putting up a 6% rate of return in your portfolio, but yet you can then borrow a dollar against a dollar. Instead of managing, for argument’s sake, a billion dollars, now you are managing $2 billion with leverage, your return now is 12% essentially, I’m simplifying it. So, that’s what they do.
Now if you imagine commodities, such as the natural gas trade, you can borrow almost exponentially against that. So what happened was when the commodity trade turned around, when natural gas hit a rough spot, and Nick Maounis, the CEO and founder, who was a tremendous investor, would tell you that it was conspiracy against him, and he’s suing JP Morgan now based on that. He couldn’t sell, there were no buyers.
He owed JP Morgan money, because he had borrowed from them to buy these natural gas positions. So JP Morgan comes to him and says, “You know what? We want this back. We will pay you $750 million,” to pick a number, I think that’s the actual number, “for your natural gas position.” And Nick knew that he was selling it at the bottom, and just a few months later JP Morgan, who had bought the position from him, turned around and sold it at a huge profit.
So, that’s what I mean. It took the ability for him, because he owed somebody else money, and the portfolio decision essentially became theirs. It took the ability for him away where he would be able to wait out the trade until the fundamentals turned. So, you can be right on the fundamentals of the trade, but be wrong because you took too much debt on.
You write about an individual, specifically the CEO of Chesapeake, who did this individually, right? In his own portfolio?
Weiss: Yeah, Aubrey McClendon, who’s in the news today, actually, selling more of Chesapeake’s assets because the company had too much debt. Aubrey was an all in guy. Now, in fairness to Aubrey, if he didn’t go all in he would never be worth $4 billion to begin with.
Right.
Weiss: But he kept borrowing against his Chesapeake holdings. Now he started the company with a partner, with Tom Ward with $50,000, and grew that into the largest natural gas company in the world. But then when tough times hit in 2008 and the stock kept coming down, he got a $750 million dollar margin call, because he kept borrowing against his stock holdings to buy more stock. That’s a great trade for a CEO, but there’s also got to be balance.
When he got that margin call he had to sell virtually all of his Chesapeake shares. And the market was kind of alarmed by this too. They said, “Why is he selling? We’re going to sell.” It exacerbated the down side, so he was forced to sell at lower and lower prices. Foolish investors came in and sold at lower prices, and everybody sold at the bottom. That was the typical example.
Now he’s going the other way. Chesapeake was also a highly leveraged entity, in addition to him being leveraged personally. Now he’s selling down, or he’s essentially selling assets to pay down the debt. And that’s what he did today.
What about some other examples of things that you write about in the book?
Weiss: Well, one is, Lee Cooperman is a good example. Again, he’s a good friend of mine, and just a phenomenal investor. But, what Lee did was he had somebody who he trusted rather that worked for him. This individual, who was about 33 years old, and Lee had paid $30 million in compensation over the last three years. He’d done a good job for Lee.
Lee has a very, very stringent investment process. This individual came to Lee and said, “ I want to invest in Aizerbijan.” And if you go back to that period when the Soviet Union was breaking up, and when the communist block was disintegrating, they gave out vouchers, or sold vouchers to their employees, to their citizens rather.
[phone rings]
Could you hold on one second Zack?
OK, I’m sorry.
No worries.
Weiss: Let me back up, so what they did was these countries, these former communist countries, in an effort to raise money for the country, to build out things- did I lose you again, Zack?
I’m here.
Weiss: OK, and in an effort to go more of a capitalistic path they either gave vouchers out to their citizens, or sold vouchers to them. And those vouchers, they could exchange for shares in the companies that were now going to become public on the stock exchange.
In Czechoslovakia they did it with virtually all the state owned companies, hoping to also attract foreign capital to help the country grow and replenish the government’s kitty, essentially. So they could build roads and all that stuff.
This individual who worked for Lee came to him and said, “OK, Azerbaijan, I’ve done a lot of work here, and they are going to privatize their energy company, their oil company. It’s one of the biggest in the world.” And what they were doing is they were selling vouchers to citizens in exchange for shares in that.
Lee vets the process in front of his nine member investment committee, they do their investigation, and they say, “OK, let’s go ahead and do it.” Now, for Lee, it was a relatively small investment. It was about $100 million that they invested. Which was small for him, sounds large to the normal person, but small, wasn’t a full position.
And Lee speaks to the head of the energy commission in Azerbaijan, he talks to even the President of Azerbaijan, saying, “Yes, yes, yes, we are going to make this a public company.” And the way Lee looked at it is, “If I can buy shares in the Azerbaijan oil company at ‘X’, I can make six times my money based upon its true value in the market.” And why was he getting it so cheap? Because, of course, there was a little risk to it.
Three months go by, it doesn’t go public, five months go by, it turns out to be a scam. What happens was this individual that brought this idea to the person who worked for Lee was somebody named Viktor Kozeny. Viktor Kozeny is also known as the pirate of Prague.
He was an individual who talked himself- he was just a dyed in the wool con-man. He had talked himself into Harvard University, having come from Czechoslovakia where he grew up. And, eventually went back to Czechoslovakia, set up a fund called the Harvard funds, which is nothing more than a Ponzi scheme. And told investors, if they contributed their vouchers, because they went through the voucher system too, he would guarantee them a 10 time return on their money, if they wanted to take their money out within the first year, they could take it all out.
No down side.
Weiss: No down side to it. Well, Kozeny wound up owning 15% of the entire industrial complex in Czechoslovakia. The government got wise, they got on his tail, he left with about a billion dollars in his pocket. First went to Switzerland, then settled in Liperchy [assumed spelling], and Aspen. While in Aspen, befriended a guy who worked for Liperchy also, Leonard Bork. And he said, “Let’s fly around the world in my plane and see where else they’re doing this, we can make a lot of money. They wound up in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan was going through the same thing and decided, “OK, this is what we are going to do.”
[phone rings]
And, I’m not going to get it this time.
You can just grab it if you need to.
Weiss: Well, we’ll see if they call back.
They did it. They raised money from Lee and they went over, literally duffle bags full of cash to buying vouchers on the quarter. Unbeknownst to Lee, the guy who worked for him went to two of Lee’s investors, Columbia University, where Lee was on the board of trustees, he attended business school there, and General Electric, their pension fund, and took money from them as well, about $25 million. So they’re about $125-130 million in, and it turns out that it was all a scam, and the government of Azerbaijan was in on it.
What wound up happening is the government came in and charge Lee’s employee with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which is bribing foreign officials. They charged Lee’s fund, Omega, with it, not Lee, and of course Kozeny, and also Bork. Kozeny was staying in the Bahamas, they threw him in jail for two years, but then let him out. These employees awaiting sentencing. Omega just paid a fine, even though they weren’t guilty of anything. And everybody went on their way a little poorer.
But the message is that emerging markets are treacherous, and even somebody as brilliant as Lee Cooperman can get fooled if there’s fraud. There’s really very little ways to protect against true fraud, as we saw with Madoff. The trick is, what Lee did, to keep your risk level down so that if it’s an area you are unfamiliar with, or an area that has higher risk, size your position accordingly. But also leave investing in the true emerging markets to professionals. Don’t try and do it yourself.
And, by the way, as we’ve heard over and over again, if it sounds like it’s too good to be true, then it is too good to be true. That’s the story of Lee Cooperman of Omega Advisors. Lee has of course recovered quite well, and it hasn’t hurt his reputation at all.
You must be great at parties, you have some great stories to share. Can we talk about Bill Ackman? Ackman is one of my favorite hedgies. He’s made some great calls, obviously, he’s also taken his licks on some other ones. Can you talk about the lessons you have learned from describing his experiences?
Weiss: Yeah, so here’s the story. I went in to go talk to Bill Ackman, who couldn’t be more gracious. He said, “OK, what do you want to talk about? I love the concept of your book.” I said I want to talk about Sears. And he says, “Sears? I’ve got a better one for you than that. I’ve lost a lot more money. Borders was more of a screw up.” He didn’t lose more money in Borders, but he said it was much more of a screw up, on Borders Group.
He gave me complete access to the CEO of Borders, which was an analyst of his that put him in the position. He said to the analyst, “You know what? basically you screwed this up, you go run the company.” What happened was, they had owned Barnes and Noble, and what they saw when they saw Barnes and Nobel was, they saw, basically, and this is going back of course now about three to four years, they saw a company that generated a lot of cash flow, wasn’t particularly well run, but was going to be well run, because they had management in there that was very good management.
As Bill sat with them, they got it. They could rationalize their store base, in other words get rid of the unprofitable stores, change their merchandise around, and increase the profitability.
[phone rings]
I will get this one, hold on. Wrong number.
OK, so he said, “OK, great.” So they did that with Barnes and Nobel, and they made a lot of money in the trade. They looked around and they said, “You know what? There’s another company like this, and that’s Borders Group.” It’s really the same business model, and the other thing they really liked about the business model was that, and I never knew this about the publishing industry, but the thing they liked about the business model was that they could buy as many books as they want from the publisher, and return the unsold books to them. They had no inventory risk.
No inventory risk, right.
Weiss: And that’s why the publishing business is bad. One of the reasons. So great, they went in they saw too many stores, the wrong merchandise mix, not as good a cash flow company as Barnes and Noble, but still a good company.
What Bill saw was- he said, “This is a destination store, people will go there, spend time, and we can put other products in there, and based upon those other products, we can increase our margins away from books.” Well, the difference was that the management was horrendous, it didn’t work. They changed the management a few times, and that they had already begun the store rationalization process. There wasn’t a lot more to rationalize, and the fundamentals of the publishing industry were quickly eroding.
As they put the new merchandise in the stores, they found that people weren’t going there to buy electronics and backpacks and all the other stuff. And that Amazon was really killing them. So people would go there, sit in their chairs and read books, but not walk out having bought any.
The investment really soured, and they are going to file for bankruptcy. But he got caught, so he kept lending them more money. Again, he sized the position correctly. I don’t know how much he’s lost on it, because he hasn’t disclosed, but it was just a major mistake, and he violated one of his principle disciplines, which was the fact that Borders has significant debt, whereas Barnes and Noble didn’t. Barnes and Noble had a very clean balance sheet. And that was the difference.
So he said, “I do not invest in over leveraged companies.” And he invested in an over leveraged company, and he learned from his mistake, he won’t do it again.
So, one of the reviews of your book, a friend of mine Jay over at Market Folly, he said one of the take-aways from the book was, “Passion is not an investment strategy.”
Weiss: Right. So lets talk about that.
This is Kerkorian. And, Kerkorian is a brilliant businessman and great investor, but he loved American cars. He’s Armenian. He’s always driven American cars. He’s in his 90s. I don’t know how much he’s driving now. He’s pretty fit.
Because of his love for American cars, arguably, he got into the car business. So, the first time he got in was with Chrysler, and he made billions of dollars. It was when Chrysler was going belly up. He came in and helped rescue them with the government. They turned that around and made a lot of money. Because of that he, and partly just because he loved the US autos, he went into GM. So, that was his first foray back into cars after Chrysler, a few years had elapsed.
But, what was different was that the economy was starting to erode. GM was losing its way, and losing market share to the Japanese car manufacturers, and it wasn’t the same. Now, he came out of GM basically flat. He made about $125 million in dividends, but that’s only because people thought that he was going to take it over. So, the market came in and supported him. They had his back. In a vacuum he would have lost money, as we saw GM eventually had major problems, and that was the beginning of it.
And then [inaudible; 0:28:38] on all the US cars, and obviously I wasn’t privy to his conversations. He’s a very private guy. He went in and he bought Ford, and he tried to do the same thing there. And, at that point I just don’t believe he did enough due diligence. He loved, you know, the US car business. He thought he’d make money at it, and he couldn’t. That’s why passion is not an investment strategy.
The common theme here is leverage. He also borrowed significantly to buy the Ford position, leveraging, borrowing against his MGM position. And he had to sell Ford near the bottom, because the decision was taken out of his hands, because the stock that he had margined, MGM, was also going down the [with] the economy.
Obviously it would have worked a lot differently if he could have held on.
Weiss: Right. Right. Oh, absolutely. So, the bottom turned around after that. But, you know, the same thing with Aubrey McClendon. If he had held on, he would be double off where he had sold; Kerkorian would have been up three fold from where he sold, and would have made a nice gain on the stock.
So, these stories are obviously about the mega-wealthy, the uber investor, the guru investor. I mean, are really some of these take-aways applicable to smaller investors, individual investors?
Weiss: Oh, absolutely. In terms of how you live your life. We talked about leverage. So, instead of stocks let’s put houses there. So, an individual thinks the value of his house is going up, and he’s margining against it, which means he’s taking out a bigger mortgage. He’s taking out a home equity loan. So, he’s taking on more debt, because that asset he thinks is going to continue to increase in value.
And then that asset, that house, like a stock, goes down in value. Now he’s got too much debt. What he borrowed against isn’t worth what it was. So, now he’s got to sell it, and it’s not in his control. And, he’s got to sell it at a big discount to what it could eventually be worth at one time. Same thing, too many investors use margin.
Or, somebody walks into a store and buys a pair of Nike running shoes. “I really love these Nike running shoes.” And then they buy a Nike sweatshirt, “I really love this Nike sweatshirt.” They say, “I like it so much I’m going to buy stock.” Now Nike is a good company, but it doesn’t mean that the stock is appropriately valued.
So, they buy the stock in Nike because of their passion for the Nike goods. And, that’s a strategy that doesn’t always work.
I always felt like Peter Lynch, obviously one of the greats, but the ‘buy what you know philosophy’, with the story about him going in and buying Hanes, or whatever it was, because his wife used the pantyhose, like it did the investors a disservice, because the company and the stock are not the same thing.
Weiss: Exactly right. And Peter Lynch didn’t buy just because of that. That started him doing work on it. So, he did all his analysis, and all his due diligence on it. And Peter Lynch, not that he wouldn’t be a great investor now, I’m sure he would be, but that was a different time.
There’s much more information out there. So, the unknown story about Hanes being great underwear and they’re being in every store, that gets picked up right away. It doesn’t take a while to get disseminated. So, investing is more efficient now. There are fewer unknown bargains.
So, one of the strategies that I talk about in my book is piggybacking guru investors, meaning going out and looking at the Ackman portfolios, and actually not just buying blindly because Ackman was buying GGP, per se, but actually performing some historical analytics on his portfolio and finding out what the best way to play Ackman, maybe it’s buying his largest holding, or his newest holding, and I actually run portfolios based upon some of this.
These types of investors who can look at their losses and learn from them, are these the types of guys that you would recommend piggybacking?
Weiss: Yeah, piggybacking I have mixed emotions about.
OK, tell me why.
Weiss: I’ll give you an example. When I was sales, I’m covering all of these funds. I though I was a pretty good salesperson. I always did pretty well on my own accounts. I had one account that if I talked about five ideas, they’d pick the one that didn’t work. It was uncanny. I almost felt like shorting every idea they picked of mine, but it was my idea, versus doing well with all the others.
So piggybacking on an investor- if you do an analysis on investor returns- Paulson, for example, huge hit in gold. Right? Big hit in the financials, but lots of other laggers. He owns a huge position at Pfizer, didn’t really work out. He’s done better now. But, the point is that their hit rates aren’t 100%. They’re very far from it.
So, if you’re going to piggyback on an investor you’ve really got to piggyback on a number of their positions, because all you see is the public side of it. You don’t see how they hedge the position out. You don’t know if it’s- for example, they could buy Freeport; FCX. Freeport’s got both gold and cooper. They may only want it for the cooper portion, and they hedge out the gold portion.
So, that’s just one example. You don’t know what else is going on, particularly with a hedge fund. You’ve got to look at your absolute size in the positions.
Now, could you do well buying their largest, high-confidence positions? Sure.
That’s the idea of buying best ideas, right? Just their largest, and that’s somehow being representative of their overall performance.
Weiss: Right. So, I guess don’t put all your eggs in one basket. It’s just not that easy. It’s not that easy. There’s something to be said for it, to me it’s just signal, “Go and do some work on it.”
Yeah. Any color on how you would recommend to individual investors, or other professional investors? It’s clear to me, also, some of the other work that you did was this distinct from the actual investor himself, meaning you’re the one sort of looking at his mistakes and learning from it. Is it clear that the investor himself is learning from it? I guess what I’m trying to get to-
Weiss: Yes. Absolutely.
What are the tools that we can use to sort of reckon our own portfolios?
Weiss: Well, you have to learn from yourself as well as from others. So, be honest, be introspective, both on your winning trades and your losing trades. And draw up a checklist. Keep a little list of where you went wrong. You know, did you buy this stock up 20% because you got caught up in the emotions, you thought it was going to go up another 20%. So, every investor needs a discipline. They need a buy discipline, they need a sell discipline. It’s most helpful if you write down the tenets of that discipline.
The best investors are the most disciplined investors. They don’t try to reinvent their investment philosophy every day, or every week, or every month. Warren Buffet, very, very disciplined. Hasn’t changed how he looks at things since he started in the business. Bill Ackman, changed a little bit, but basically he’s got five tenets of investing, five rules he follows.
So, that’s how I would advise the retail investor. The mistakes that are made in the book are all retail investor mistakes, every single one of them. The dollar numbers are bigger, but the mistakes are the same.
And they’re based pretty much on human frailties, right?
Weiss: Yes, for the most part. Yep.
So, Stephen, before we finish up-
Weiss: Yeah, I’ve got a call, so I’ve got to wrap up.
I want to ask one more question. I ask this of all of the guests. Any recommendations for material, books, web resources that investors can use to get smarter, or things that you use that you’d recommend to other people?
Weiss: I’m just an information junkie.
Yeah. I figured that.
Weiss: I try to read everything I can. I try to make myself smarter. I try to look at other- I’m a big believer in cross asset knowledge, so I look at the fixed income market. I try to see what sort of hints there are there. They do a better job [at] balance sheet analysis. So, I don’t think you want go investment overload.
But, just you’ve got to work at it. You’ve got to spend time learning. And, reading some investment books is actually a good thing. I wrote one, you wrote one. It’s a good thing, but you can read too many of them. And, you have to decide what style and philosophy resonates with you, and what you really think you can live by, and live by that. But you have to live by discipline.
It’s been great, Stephen. Good luck with the upcoming books.
Weiss: Great. Thanks so much. Thank you.
All the best. OK. Bye-Bye.
That was Stephen Weiss, the author of The Billion Dollar Mistake: Learning the Art of Investing Through the Missteps of Legendary Investors. I hope you enjoyed the conversation with him.
As always we welcome your feedback at the blog, Tradestreaming.com – positive feedback, negative feedback, any ideas you have for future podcasts, we’d love to hear from you. Look out for a podcast next week. Thanks for joining on Tradestreaming Radio.
More Resources
- check out the podcast above (or, if you don’t see it, here). If you use iTunes, our program can be found here
- Tradestream radio archives